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Abstract—Authenticated lateral movement via compromised
accounts is a common adversarial maneuver that is challenging
to discover with signature- or rules-based intrusion detection
systems. In this work a behavior-based approach to detecting
malicious logins to novel systems indicative of lateral movement
is presented, in which a user’s historical login activity is used to
build a model of putative “normal” behavior. This historical login
activity is represented as a collection of daily login graphs, which
encode authentications among accessed systems. Each system, or
graph vertex, is described by a set of graph centrality measures
that characterize it and the local topology of its login graph.
The unsupervised technique of non-negative matrix factorization
is then applied to this set of features to assign each vertex to
a role that summarizes how the system participates in logins.
The reconstruction error quantifying how well each vertex fits
into its role is then computed, and the statistics of this error can
be used to identify outlier vertices that correspond to systems
involved in unusual logins. We test this technique with a small
cohort of privileged accounts using real login data from an
operational enterprise network. The ability of the method to
identify malicious logins among normal activity is tested with
simulated graphs of login activity representative of adversarial
lateral movement. We find that the method is generally successful
at detecting a broad range of lateral movement for each user,
with false positive rates significantly lower than those resulting
from alerts based solely on login novelty.
Index Terms—intrusion detection, lateral movement, graph
anomaly detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Ahealthy mindset in cybersecurity is that your networkwill eventually be breached, that it is only a matter of
time before your perimeter defenses and endpoint protections
fail and the adversary gains access to your enterprise. Once
inside the network, the adversary will get quiet—they will live
off the land stealing credentials and moving between systems
via authenticated access rather than launching noisy exploits
or deploying malware that could trigger alarms. They will
do their best to look like authorized users doing legitimate
things. The healthy mindset is therefore not to expend all one’s
efforts securing the outer walls, but to also invest in shoring
up internal defenses. The challenge is that, while commercial
solutions abound for perimeter and endpoint security, the
few offerings that tackle the problem of lateral movement
tend to take considerable time to configure and test, and are
often proprietary black boxes (e.g. Windows ATA or FireEye
TAP). That’s not to say that organizations don’t have effective
defensive strategies making use of internal sensor data and
logs, but these tend to involve rule-based indicators. The
trouble with static rules is that they apply to known, explicit
patterns of activity, that is, the threat indicators must have been
previously observed. Furthermore, there is a sort of selection
bias at play in which only those threat activities that possess
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stable and recognizable signatures are ever even considered
for detection. Alas, authenticated lateral movement does not
follow an explicit or recurrent pattern: the sequence and tempo
of accesses, and the tools used and the systems targeted, vary
according to the whims, tactics, and plans of the adversary.
Lateral movement via compromised accounts does have a
common tell: the adversary’s pattern of accesses need not
include systems visited very often, if ever, by the compromised
account. Such novel logins might be a sign that a credential
has been stolen or an authorized user is up to no good. But
for privileged accounts with broad access like network ad-
ministrators, novel logins might also be normal and common.
Since such accounts are precisely those most often targeted
by attackers, this particular indicator will generate many false
positives, potentially swamping a true signal of adversarial
activity. The difficulty here is that novelty does not imply
malice.
Given that the adversary is a rational agent intent on
achieving some objective in an orderly, stealthy manner, we
expect that there are patterns in lateral movement, but they are
not known a priori by defenders. Instead, they must be inferred
from observed activities—the problem is that data on generic
adversarial lateral movement is hard to come by in sufficient
quantities. On the other hand, organizations do have lots of
data tracking and characterizing normal activities on their
networks. Appropriate paradigms for cybersecurity analytics
are therefore unsupervised and one-class learning, in which a
sample of data describing normal activities is used to gener-
alize and model it: anything that deviates significantly from
what the model considers normal is deemed anomalous. By
carefully selecting data sources and features, these anomalies
are more than simple novelties—they are sophisticated patterns
of atypical activity relative to the user’s baseline behavior—
with consequently much lower false positive rates than the
alternatives.
In this paper, we explore the application of unsupervised
learning to the detection of malicious authenticated logins
indicative of adversarial lateral movement. The method iden-
tifies malicious logins as anomalies in login graphs of a
given user’s authentication activity over some historical period.
A login graph is a weighted, directed graph depicting all
of the user’s remote login activity over a 24-hour period:
vertices are systems and directed edges are logins between
them. The historical period typically spans several weeks, and
so is comprised of dozens of login graphs. Each vertex is
summarized in terms of a set of graph centrality and topology
measures, and then the set of all vertices are taken together
and transformed by the method of non-negative matrix factor-
ization. The purpose of this transformation is to assign each
vertex to one of a small set of roles, and then measure how well
each fits into its role using the transformation’s reconstruction
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2error. By analyzing the statistics of the reconstruction errors
in the sample, outlier vertices can be identified, corresponding
to systems that are accessed in ways atypical of the user in
question.
We test this approach against a small cohort of six high-
privilege users—Domain Administrators on a large, opera-
tional enterprise network. Login data is obtained from authen-
tication logs collected for each user over a period of eight
weeks and used to model the login behavior of each user.
When a novel system is seen in a user’s daily login activity, it
is tested by the model. A false positive occurs when a normal
novel login is found to be anomalous. We find generally low
false positive rates (FPR) across the cohort: two users with
FPR = 5% and the rest with FPR < 2%. In comparison
with a detection process that alerts on all novel daily logins,
these results are better by at least an order of magnitude for
these users.
Since the historical data used to construct the model is
presumed normal, the models must be validated on data
indicative of malicious activity. We therefore generate a varied
set of adversarial login graphs, which are devised to be rep-
resentative of a threat’s lateral movement tactics for two use-
cases: when the threat moves solely between novel systems,
and when they move between known and novel systems. True
positive rates (TPR) for the novel-to-novel case are, with
few exceptions, greater than 95% across the full range of
adversarial graphs for all users in the cohort. The second use-
case is more challenging, but with TPR still in excess of 90%
for most users across most adversarial graphs.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of lateral movement detection has attracted
many attempts at solution, including rules- and behavior-based
approaches. As an adaptive method based on learning user
behaviors, we contrast the present work with other behavior-
based approaches. These approaches tend to target either host-
based activities or network behaviors. Host-based activities
indicative of lateral movement might include suspicious use of
certain programs [1], system calls [2], [3], [4], [5], or terminal
commands [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
In contrast to these approaches, this work seeks to detect
lateral movement solely by the patterns of adversarial access
across the network, independently of underlying method. This
approach is fundamentally graph-based, as are several other
related studies. The work of [11] makes use of login graphs
which are characterized in terms of a set of global measures,
like the number of vertices, number of arcs, and graph diam-
eter. Logistic regression was then used to compare the login
graphs of a given user at different times to look for changes
that might suggest account compromise. The accuracy of the
regression model is comparable to the models developed in this
paper; however, their method employed supervised learning
on normal and sample attack data, and login graphs spanned
several weeks. In contrast, in this work we seek a method that
can find anomalies relative to normal data only, on time scales
of hours or days so that alerts are actionable.
In [12], combined login graphs of groups of users are con-
structed and intruders are sought by removing users one-by-
one and comparing the similarities of the resulting subgraphs.
This approach has applications to collaborative information
systems, for which groups of users are expected to assume
common roles. In contrast, our work is focused on ascertaining
anomalous login behavior by comparing events with a single
user’s historical activity, not through comparisons with collec-
tive or group behaviors since the users of interest might not
form such groups.
The work of [13] looks for anomalies in login graphs indica-
tive of malicious insider activity. Three types of anomalies are
considered: modifications, insertions, and deletions. In contrast
to our work, which looks for anomalous vertices, this analysis
is at the level of the login graph itself. Given the potentially
large daily variability of user’s login graphs (see Figures 2
and 3), the anomaly tests of [13] would be expected to yield
many false positives for our application. This highlights the
challenge of the current project—to find potentially subtle but
unusual characteristics of individual vertices in login graphs
with widely varying global properties across the historical
record.
To this end we explore methods of graph anomaly detection
that focus on more localized characteristics of graph vertices.
The field of graph-based anomaly detection [14], [15] is ex-
pansive with methods covering virtually any application. The
most relevant techniques to our case are those that characterize
vertices using local and neighborhood metrics, and then apply
outlier detection to collections of these vertices [16], [17], [18].
The application of [18] is not lateral movement, but more
general intrusion detection: graphs are formed from entities
(like IP addresses or users) present in various sensors and
detection logs, and edges connect those entities that appear
together in at least one alert. These vertices are then evaluated
in terms of recurrent graph measures [19], assigned roles
using non-negative matrix factorization (following [20]), and
the roles of each vertex are tracked over time for anomalous
changes. This is the kind of local, graph-based detection we
are interested here, but the novel logins we seek to examine
have no history and so a time series analysis is not appropriate.
Our use of non-negative matrix factorization is therefore rather
different: it is not for assigning roles that can monitored over
time, but for assigning roles simultaneously to all vertices in
the historical sample, and identifying those that don’t fit well
into any role.
III. LOGIN GRAPHS AND FEATURES
In this work we seek to characterize the authentication
behaviors of individual users. The behavioral profile is es-
tablished over a chosen time period and is derived from
historical login records collected over this time period. From
this record, each system remotely accessed by the user in
each 24-hour period is evaluated according to a set of features
that characterize the user’s login behavior with respect to that
system. The behavioral profile is then the set of these feature
vectors.
A. Login graphs
The basic data structure used in this analysis is the daily
login graph of a particular user, Figure 1. It is a weighted,
3directed graph depicting all the user’s remote login activity
over a 24-hour period. The vertices are information systems
and a directed edge (u, v) between vertices u and v represents
successful authentication from system u to system v. The
edges are weighted according to the number of logins that
occur over the time period covered by the login graph. This
Fig. 1: Daily login graph of a user. Vertices are systems and directed edges
indicate logins. Edges are weighted according to number of logins occurring
over the 24-hour period.
graph can be generated using any authentication log that
includes source and destination systems and a timestamp of
the login1.
We next decide on the time period over which we wish to
model the user’s login behavior, which should be long enough
such that the model is stable and accurate2. In this work, we
find that eight weeks is a sufficient amount of time to construct
reliable models of the cohort of six users considered in our
analysis.
From day to day, a given user’s login activity can vary
greatly. In Figure 2, seven consecutive days of login graphs of
the same user are shown: they vary considerably in the number
of vertices, edges, and general topology. This variability can
be quantified in terms of the graph edit distance,
GED(g1, g2) = |V1|+|V2|−2|V1∩V2|+|E1|+|E2|−2|E1∩E2|,
(1)
where Vi and Ei are the vertex and edge sets of gi and
vertical bars denote cardinality. The GED provides a measure
of the difference between two graphs, reflecting the changes
in their vertex and edge sets. To get a quantitative sense of the
variability of login activity of the user cohort over time, we
apply the GED to each user’s consecutive login graphs, Figure
3. Most users exhibit dramatic daily variability, suggesting that
global measures of graph similarity, like the GED, are not
useful for graph anomaly detection in this domain. Instead,
we consider a more local assessment of anomalous activity—
at the level of individual vertices and their local neighborhoods
in a login graph.
1On Windows systems, successful authentications are recorded as event
type 4624 in Windows Event Logs.
2As assessed via a process akin to cross-validation; we describe this process
later.
Index Metric
0 out degree, kout
1 out degree (rescaled), kout/(wout + 1)
2 in degree, kin
3 in degree (rescaled), kin/(win + 1)
4 local clustering, c
5 Katz centrality, eK
6 ego degree, E
7 out weight, wout
8 in weight, win
9 degree, k
10 eccentricity (ego-reduced), /(E + 1)
11 eccentricity (weight-reduced), /(wout + 1)
12 eccentricity, 
TABLE I: Graph topology and centrality measures considered in this
analysis. Measures will be referred to by their index later in the paper.
B. Graph measures
We consider a variety of features that characterize the
centrality and local neighborhood topology of individual graph
vertices, v, including: in degree (kin); out degree (kout); in
weight (win); out weight (wout); left Katz centrality,
eK(v) = α
∑
s
AvseK(s) + β, (2)
where α is an attenuation factor, β is an initial centrality given
to all vertices, and A is the graph adjacency matrix; local
clustering coefficient,
c(v) =
2T (v)
k(v)(k(v)− 1) (3)
where T (v) is the number of triangles through v and k(v)
is its degree; total degree of v’s egonet, that is, the subgraph
formed from v and its neighboring nodes,
E(v) = k(v) +
∑
s∈N
k(s) (4)
where the sum is taken over all nodes in v’s neighborhood, N ;
and eccentricity, , which is the longest directed path from the
vertex. We also consider a few quantities derived from these
base measures, including degree k = kin+ kout, two kinds of
“reduced” eccentricity: /(E + 1) and /(wout + 1), and two
rescaled degree measures: kin/(win+1) and kout/(wout+1).
The full collection of graph metrics is given in Table I.
IV. OUTLIERS FROM NMF RECONSTRUCTION ERROR
Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) is primarily a di-
mensionality reduction technique (see [21] for a nice review).
It has found success in a range of applications, including
image segmentation and text mining, for its ability to find
efficient, sparse representations of high-dimensional feature
spaces. From n data points xi ∈ Rp, the matrix X ∈ Rp×n
is formed. The objective of NMF is to find two non-negative
matrices G and F such that
Xnp ≈ GnrFrp, (5)
where r < min(p, n) is the number of roles, or the dimen-
sionality of the reduced set of basis elements. Since each data
point xi will generally have non-zero components along each
of the r directions, it will belong to a mixture of roles. The
4Fig. 2: Seven consecutive days of a user’s login activity. There is considerable variability in the number of systems accessed and the topology of the login
graph.
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Fig. 3: GED of six users applied to consecutive login graphs over the course
of 40 days.
factorization is found by minimizing the Frobenius norm of
the error,
||X−GF||2F =
∑
i,j
(X −GF )2ij , (6)
with G > 0 and F > 0. NMF is a non-convex optimization
problem, and so a single matrix X can have many possible
factorizations. For this study, we employ coordinate descent
for the optimization and initialize with the singular value
decomposition of X to enforce sparsity of the factorization,
that is, to ensure that points tend to map into single roles.
With sparse representations and/or those with fewer roles than
the dimension of the original feature space, NMF results in
a compression of the original data that necessarily involves
the loss of information. The amount of information lost
is quantified in terms of the transformation’s reconstruction
error.
We propose the NMF reconstruction error of a datapoint,
xi, as an outlier measure,
δxi =
∑
j,k
(Xij −GikFkj)2. (7)
Similar to other reconstruction error-based outlier detection
schemes, like principal component analysis or autoencoders,
the transformation to the reduced basis set is largely informed
by the bulk of normal points in the sample. If outliers are
few and sufficiently different, they will not fit well into the
available roles—they will not be well reconstructed by the
transformation—and the error Eq. (7) will be relatively large.
To find anomalous points, we simply apply a threshold to the
reconstruction scores and take the outliers.
As an unsupervised anomaly detection method, there is no
model training. All that is required is a store of putatively
“normal” historical data against which to compare the new
data to be tested. Suppose we wish to test each user’s daily
login activity. In this work, we use the prior eight weeks
of the user’s historical login data, including the day to be
tested, compiled into daily (24-hour) login graphs. Days with
no login activity lack corresponding graphs. A selected set of
graph metrics from Section III are evaluated for each system
on each day and the matrix X is formed, where each row
is indexed by hostname and day. Next, NMF is applied to
X and the reconstruction error is computed—those vertices
corresponding to novel systems from the test day lying outside
a chosen confidence limit of the resulting distribution are
considered anomalous.
V. FINDING UNUSUAL LOGINS BETWEEN NOVEL SYSTEMS
When a privileged account is compromised, it is possible
that the adversary will use the stolen credentials to authenticate
to systems that the compromised account has not previously
accessed. Any such novel login is of potential interest to
network defenders because it marks a clear deviation from the
established authentication behavior of the user in question.
Yet, given that this behavior is derived from a finite set of
historical data (here, several weeks worth), any system that is
legitimately accessed less frequently than the duration of the
historical record is effectively novel. An anomaly detection
system looking for this kind of novelty will generate false
alarms, especially for users that do this frequently.
The approach developed here is designed to only flag novel
logins if they are unusual with respect to how the user tends
to login to systems. In short, it’s not the novelty but the nature
of the login: how often the novel system is accessed, whether
and what kinds of other systems are accessed from it, what
kinds of systems it is accessed from, and so on. The graph
metrics presented in Section III were selected to provide this
kind of characterization.
To demonstrate the approach and introduce our experimental
procedure, we apply it to a simple but relevant situation: logins
between novel systems; that is, between two or more systems
not previously accessed over the course of the user’s historical
record. In the next section we will consider logins between
novel and known systems.
To build a model of a user’s historical login behavior, we
must select a set of graph metrics, m = {m1,m2, ...,mi} ∈
5Require: r, m, α, set of login graphs
Initialize array FPR
for j = 1 to 25 do
g ← randomize login graph subset of size N
XN ← compute graph metrics m of all nodes in g
apply NMF with r roles to X
compute reconstruction errors
FPR[j] ← compute type I error at threshold α
end for
FPR← mean FPR
return FPR
Fig. 4: Algorithm to compute false positive rate of a model with metric set
m, number of roles, r, and significance level, α.
M from Table I and decide on the number of NMF roles, r, to
use. These selections will be those that minimize the model’s
false positive rate (FPR) and maximize its true positive rate
(TPR); we will explain how we arrive at a TPR for an
unsupervised model shortly. To establish the FPR of a given
model (a choice of m and r) we generate a login graph for
each day in the user’s historical record. We then shuffle the set
of graphs and split it into two subsets: a larger one of size N
(here 80% of the graphs) and a smaller one. The smaller one
is set aside—it is not used. Assuming that the login graphs are
not correlated across days, the larger set can be thought of as
one possible 6.5 week history. The matrix X is formed from
the vertices in the larger set, NMF is applied, and vertices with
reconstruction errors in the top α% are considered outliers.
The FPR is then computed as the ratio no,new/N , where
no,new the number of novel systems that are outliers. This
process is repeated multiple times (here, 25): the full set of
login graphs is shuffled, split, NMF is performed, and outliers
are found. We perform several iterations in order to test the
generalizability of the model, with each iteration comprising
one possible 6.5 week history. The model’s final false positive
rate is the average over all iterations, FPR. The FPR testing
process described above is summarized as the algorithm in
Figure 4.
Computing the true positive rate for a given model is more
challenging. Anomaly detection systems based on unsuper-
vised learning lack labeled anomalous data points. This makes
model validation difficult: we can tune our model to achieve
a low false positive rate on the presumed normal data, but
how do we know whether it will perform well against the
kinds of malicious activities we’d like it to detect? To address
this problem, we generate a small collection of prototype
adversarial login graphs and use them to validate the model’s
true positive rate. It is important to emphasize that at no point
is the model trained on these prototypes—it is an unsupervised
method applied to unlabeled data. The validation set therefore
does not need to be exhaustive, but includes only prototype
patterns indicative of adversarial lateral movement.
To generate these patterns we apply a few simple rules that
describe the generic behavior of adversarial lateral movement.
The first rule is that the adversary never “doubles back”,
that is, if they login to system v from system u, they will
never login to system u from v. This is because access to the
Require: r, m, α, set of login graphs
for i = 1 to 16 do
Initialize array TPR
for j = 1 to 25 do
g ← randomize login graph subset of size N
s ← random integer in range (1, N)
inject adversarial subgraph into login graph g[s]
X ← compute graph metrics m of all nodes in g
apply NMF with r roles to X
compute reconstruction errors
TPR[i][j] ← compute type II error at threshold α
end for
TPR[i]← mean TPR for subgraph i
end for
return TPR
Fig. 5: Algorithm to compute true positive rate of a model with metric set
m, number of roles, r, and significance level, α.
originating system, in this case u, is assumed to be preserved
throughout the course of the intrusion. Second, the adversary
never accesses a system u from more than one other system,
since a single access should be sufficient to establish a foothold
on that system and multiple logins from distinct systems might
arouse suspicion. For logins among novel systems, a subgraph
generated by these rules is always a separate component in its
login graph. These rules imply that each subgraph has a single
root vertex with kin = 0; this is the system from which the
adversary originates further access.
In this study, we allow the number of systems in a subgraph
to vary between 2 and 5. This corresponds to an expected rate
of compromise of up to five systems in 24 hours. It is then
possible to enumerate all possible subgraphs with n ≤ 5 that
obey the above two rules: there are 16 possible subgraphs
(distinct up to isomorphism), Figure 6. For example, there
is one possible subgraph with two systems, namely the edge
(u, v). There are two possible subgraphs with three systems,
namely {(u, v), (v, w)} and {(u, v), (u,w)}.
To measure a model’s TPR, we proceed as we did for the
FPR determination by repeatedly shuffling and splitting the
set of login graphs, but this time an adversarial subgraph is
included as part of a randomly selected login graph. If any
of the adversarial subgraph’s vertices are detected as outliers,
that iteration is considered a true positive. The TPR is then
the number of iterations with detections divided by the total
number of iterations (here, 25). The TPR is computed in terms
of iterations rather than vertices (like FPR) since the detection
of a single login is sufficient to discover the adversary on
that day (iteration). By including the adversarial subgraph in
a different randomly selected login graph each iteration, we
are testing the model’s ability to detect that type of subgraph
over a range of possible 6.5 week histories. A separate set of
iterations is performed for each adversarial subgraph type, i,
and for each type the TPRs are averaged over the iterations,
TPRi. This algorithm is provided in Figure 5.
Now that we’ve described how to measure the FPR and
TPR of a prospective model, we next discuss how to find well-
performing models. We demonstrate this approach in detail for
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Fig. 6: The complete set of 16 possible adversarial subgraphs including between 2 and 5 vertices.
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Fig. 7: (a) True positive rates (TPR) and false positive rates (FPR) of models with a variety of parameterizations for Admin1. Black points are the results
of single models parameterized as labeled, and red squares are the results of combining the two models in the label as an ensemble. (b) True positive rate
vs. adversarial subgraph type for the best performing ensemble (red dashed), (1, 6)+ (7, 11), together with each model separately: (1, 6) (black) and (7, 11)
(blue).
7one user in the cohort, hereafter referred to as Admin1, and
later summarize results for all others. A model is determined
by the set of graph metrics,m, and the number of roles, r, used
in the NMF transformation. The minimum size of the set m is
two elements, and NMF requires that r ≤ |m|. Starting with
|m| = 2, r = 1, we perform a grid search over all (132 ) = 78
two-parameter combinations of the 13 graph measures of Table
I. With the significance level, α, fixed (here, α = 0.053) FPR
and TPRi are computed for each combination. This search
is repeated for r = 2. Then, a grid search over all
(
13
3
)
=
286 combinations of three graph measures is performed for r
between 1 and 3. Exploring models with |m| > 3 becomes
prohibitive to do exhaustively, but happily this is unnecessary
since well-performing4 models are found with |m| < 3 for all
users.
We find that in no single model (choice of m and r)
performs strongly across the full range of 16 adversarial
subgraph types for any of the users in the cohort. Focusing
on Admin1, in Figure 7 (a) we show FPR vs TPRi for a
collection of two-parameter models with r = 1 (black dots).
Some models, like m = (1, 6), perform well generally but
struggle against a few subgraphs, Figure 7 (b). Meanwhile,
the model m = (7, 11) performs only moderately-well overall,
with TPRi ≈ 62%, but it does particularly well against pre-
cisely those subgraphs that challenge the model m = (1, 6).
Combining individual models into ensembles by taking the
logical OR of their detections results in a generally improved
TPRi, as illustrated in Figure 7 (b), though generally at the
expense of an increased FPR. We therefore attempt to build
well-performing ensembles out of individual models, with an
eye towards keeping FPR low.
Ensembles are formed by computing the Pearson correlation
between each model’s TPRi vector (for this analysis, only
models with the same |m| and r were compared in this
way: though not a necessary restriction, it is more efficient
and still results in well-performing models). Anti-correlated
models have complementary detection capability but there is
no guarantee that an ensemble formed from them will have
high TPRi for all i or a sufficiently low FPR. Furthermore,
there is no unique and rigorous way to identify the “best”
performing model out of a group—it is a firmly subjective
process. For example, perhaps we are willing to accept poor
performance against one or two types of adversarial subgraphs
in exchange for a lower FPR than a model that performs well
against all subgraphs. Therefore, selecting the “best” model
for each user is ultimately a manual process that lacks rigid
criteria: in selecting the models presented in this section,
we have indulged a preference for models with low FPR
even if that entails sacrificing performance against one or two
adversarial subgraph types.
The performance of each user’s selected model finds mixed
but generally positive results, Figure 8. These models all have
m = 2 and r = 1. All users achieve greater than 95% true
3After comparing across models with fixed α, the receiver operating
characteristic curve can be obtained for those of interest by varying α.
4Since the full parameter space is not searched, the models found here are
not globally optimal; hence the use of the term “well-performing” rather than
“best-performing”.
User Parameters FPR FPRnew
Admin1 (1, 6) + (7, 11) 0.0 0.1
Admin2 (3, 11) + (3, 10) 0.02 0.6
Admin3 (1, 4) + (8, 10) 0.004 0.4
Admin4 (1, 9) + (6, 11) 0.02 0.8
Admin5 (1, 6) + (0, 5) 0.01 0.3
Admin6 (1, 8) + (1, 12) 0.006 0.6
TABLE II: Average false positive rates (FPR) of users in cohort with
parameterization of best-fitting ensemble for logins between novel systems.
positive rates on most subgraph types, with false positive rates
given in Table II. The notable exception is user Admin6,
whose model does very poorly against subgraph types 1 and
3, which are of the form v1 → v2 and v1 → v2 → v3. This
user routinely logs in to novel systems from novel systems,
perhaps as part of remote administrative tasks, and so this kind
of authentication is not considered anomalous by the model.
A model with m = 2 and r = 2 was found for Admin6 that
achieved a TPR > 80% for subgraph types 1 and 3 but at the
cost of an increase in FPR to 6%.
For comparison, we include in Table II the FPR (denoted
FPRnew) that would result from a detection system configured
to alert on any novel login, that is, systems with no logins over
the course of the historical record, FPRnew = nnew/N . While
such an approach would catch all malicious authentications, it
comes at the price of a very high FPR. Note that each user has
a different best-performing model, suggesting distinct login
behaviors across users. And the lesson drawn from Admin6
is that a model’s ability to detect malicious activity is shaped
and limited by the user’s normal activity.
VI. FINDING UNUSUAL LOGINS BETWEEN NOVEL AND
KNOWN SYSTEMS
Having introduced our model construction and testing
methodology on a rather special use case, we next apply
these techniques to the more general situation where the
adversary authenticates to novel systems from known systems,
and vice versa (hereafter referred to as “novel-to-known” with
the understanding that it includes logins from known-to-novel
systems as well). We again use the set of 16 adversarial
subgraphs as prototypes for validation, but now each subgraph
must include a known system as one of its vertices; that is,
the subgraphs are no longer separate components in the login
graphs. To measure the true positive rate of a model against
a particular adversarial subgraph, the procedure described in
Section V is used but, this time, one vertex of the subgraph
is chosen at random and replaced by a randomly selected
known vertex from the randomly selected login graph at
each iteration. Because the subgraphs are no longer separate
components, the feature vectors of its vertices depend on
the nature of the login graph into which it is embedded (in
particular, metrics that characterize the local neighborhood of
the graph like ego degree, Katz centrality, and eccentricity
will vary by login graph). For these kinds of subgraphs,
validating over multiple iterations thus does more than just test
the generalizability of the model given alternate histories—it
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Fig. 8: True positive rates by adversarial subgraph type of best performing
models of each user in cohort for logins between novel systems.
assesses the model’s ability to detect a particular subgraph in
a variety of different daily login scenarios5.
A grid search over m and r is again conducted and we find
that no two-model ensemble of any kind is able to reliably
detect the full range of adversarial subgraphs. This is likely
because the number of subgraphs is effectively much larger
than 16 since the subgraph vertices depend on the embedding
login graph: the resulting variability is hard for models with
so few degrees of freedom to resolve. We therefore adopt the
obvious approach—add more models to the ensemble!
Because these ensembles will be constructed from many
models, pairwise evaluation of the Pearson correlation is
not applicable. Instead, the models are ranked within each
subgraph type and an ensemble is formed by selecting the top
model from each type. Ranking within each subgraph type is
first done by TPRi, then, models within some top percentile
(here, 10%) of this ranking are ordered by FPR. To ensure
low ensemble FPR, one can exclude models with FPR above
some threshold (here, 5%) from the rankings.
The TPRi of the best-performing model of each user in
the cohort is shown in Figure 9, and FPR’s are given along
with the model parameterization in Table III. There are several
items to note: first, the models don’t perform as well when
known systems are included in the adversarial subgraphs—
that is, it is generally harder to detect the adversary that
moves laterally from novel to known systems and vice versa
than one that moves laterally solely through novel systems.
As before, Admin6 is the worst model in the cohort, but
for the other users, apart from a few exceptions, the models
give TPR > 90% for most subgraph types. Next, models
have higher FPRs than in the novel-to-novel case, but still
offer a significant improvement over detections based solely
on novelty. Lastly, the best-performing models are built from a
wide range of metrics combinations, from a five-combination
5In the novel-to-novel case, the adversarial subgraph was always a separate
component and so independent of the login graph into which it was embedded.
Not so in the novel-to-known case.
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Fig. 9: True positive rates by adversarial subgraph type of best performing
models of each user in cohort for logins between novel and known systems.
model (Admin6) to one constructed from 12 combinations
(Admin4). All models have |m| = 2 and r = 1 except for
Admin1, which has |m| = r = 3.
While we have constructed separate and different models
for each user for the novel-to-novel and the novel-to-known
cases, in reality each user should have a single model. Ideally,
the larger models built for the novel-to-known problem would
include the parameters chosen for the novel-to-novel problem,
however, this is generally not the case (metric combinations
that are in both models are bold-faced in Table III). For
example, Admin4, despite the large known-to-novel model,
has no combinations in common with its novel-to-novel model
and might therefore be expected to perform poorly against that
use case. We find, however, that the best-performing known-
to-novel models tend to perform as well against the novel-to-
novel problem as the two-dimensional models constructed in
the last section. This need not be true in general, in which
case the known-to-novel model would need to be augmented
with the missing metric combination from the novel-to-novel
model, possibly at the expense of increased FPR.
Lastly, we note that adversarial subgraphs in which more
than a single vertex is replaced by a known system are also
possible. We don’t test these scenarios explicitly but we expect
that adding known systems will further degrade performance
of the models. We can infer this by observing, for example,
that adding two known systems to the type 2 subgraph will
include the type 1 subgraph with one known system, as
well as the new graph with a novel system authenticating to
two known systems. We might therefore expect performance
against type 2 subgraphs with two known systems to be on
a par with performance against the type 1 subgraph with one
known system, and, in general, performance against type n
subgraphs with two known systems should resemble perfor-
mance against type n− 1 subgraphs with one known system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a new defense against adversarial authen-
ticated lateral movement that is based on learning individual
9User Parameters FPR FPRnew
Admin1 (1, 3, 5) + (1, 3, 9) + (0, 1, 3) + (3, 7, 12) + (1, 4, 8) + (2, 4, 11) + (1, 4, 7) + (1, 2, 9) 0.0005 0.1
Admin2 (1, 12) + (2, 10) + (3,10) + (4, 10) + (5, 11) + (7, 10) 0.02 0.6
Admin3 (0, 1) + (1, 2) + (1, 3) + (1, 5) + (1, 12) + (5, 10) + (5, 12) + (11, 12) 0.008 0.4
Admin4 (0, 10) + (1, 4) + (1, 6) + (1, 7) + (1, 8) + (1, 11) + (3, 6) + (4, 10) + (6, 12) + (7, 10) + (8, 10) + (9, 10) 0.05 0.8
Admin5 (0, 11) + (1,6) + (1, 7) + (1, 9) + (3, 11) + (7, 12) + (9, 10) 0.02 0.3
Admin6 (1, 4) + (1,8) + (1,12) + (4, 12) + (8, 12) 0.05 0.6
TABLE III: Mean false positive rates (FPR) of users in cohort with parameterization of best-fitting ensemble for logins between novel and known systems.
Bold-face combinations are those present in the user’s novel-to-novel model, Table II.
user’s login behaviors over time. Historical login data is
converted into daily login graphs, and then each vertex is
evaluated according to a set of graph measures that charac-
terize its centrality and local neighborhood topology. This set
of feature vectors is then transformed via non-negative matrix
factorization (NMF) into a new basis, where each vertex is
assigned to a set of roles that characterize how the user tends to
login to the corresponding system. Depending on the number
of roles used and the sparseness of the new representation,
NMF effectively compresses the original feature vectors. The
transformation’s reconstruction error is then used to find
outlier systems—those vertices that do not “fit” well into the
roles identified by the NMF.
This method is applied to the problem of detecting which of
a user’s novel logins are potentially malicious. A novel login is
an authentication to a system not seen in that user’s historical
record: high-value accounts, like network Administrators, can
have large numbers of novel logins over the course of days or
weeks. Adversaries that compromise such high-value accounts
can be expected to access novel systems as well, making the
prospects of detecting malicious novel logins a low signal-
to-noise endeavor. By applying unsupervised learning to a
user’s login behavior encoded as a set of graphs, malicious
logins can be identified as vertices with properties that deviate
significantly from the bulk. Applied to a user’s novel logins,
this approach could be a useful filter to identify logins worth
further investigation.
We test this method on a small cohort of six high-value
accounts: Domain Administrators from a large, operational
enterprise network. Login data from authentication logs is
collected over a period of eight weeks for each user. A range of
models, consisting of different sets of graph measures, m, and
numbers of NMF roles, r, are tested by computing their false
positive and true positive rates. False positive rates measure
the percentage of systems misclassified as anomalous, and true
positive rates are ascertained by testing models against a series
of simulated adversarial lateral movement graphs.
We first apply this method to the case of novel-to-novel
logins, in which the adversary moves laterally through the
network via systems not accessed by the compromised user
over the historical period. We find that no single model for
any user is capable of detecting the full range of adversarial
login types while maintaining an acceptably low false positive
rate, but well-performing ensembles can be built by taking
the logical OR of individual models. These models achieve
greater than 95% true positive rates against the great majority
of adversarial login types for all users, with false positive rates
below 2%.
Next, the method is applied to the more general case in
which the adversary accesses a known system during its
intrusion. This a more challenging problem with many more
types of adversarial login graphs, though we are able to
find moderately well-performing models by building larger
ensembles. Apart from a single user in the cohort, these models
achieve greater than 90% true positive rates against most
adversarial login types; though false positive rates are higher
with the larger ensembles, they are still ≤ 5% and at least an
order of magnitude better than rates resulting from a detection
scheme based solely on novelty.
Future research could expand this approach in several ways.
While the focus on novel logins is motivated by the failure of
conventional methods to detect threat activity involving novel
systems, it might be possible to use NMF to discover anoma-
lous login behavior of known systems over time. This could
take the form of a sequence analysis in which a system’s NMF
role is tracked over time, with anomalous behavior manifesting
as a change to a new or unlikely role. Another difficulty with
the current methodology is the discovery of well-performing
models: with such a large parameter space, it is infeasible to
search all possible models. A more sophisticated model-search
strategy could perhaps be employed to improve results. The
present work, absent these potential improvements, nonethe-
less represents an important first step towards developing a
behavior-based, malicious login detection capability.
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